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SUPPLEMENT TO APPELLANT'S ORIGINIAL BRIEF
Appellant's Brief at page 6 paragraph 6 contends that appellant quotes to two paragraphs
of an affidavit by Francee JoUey that do not appear in the affidavit This affidavit was given to
appellant's current counsel of record as part of a file maintained by appellant's trial counsel. It
was believed by appellant's current counsel to be one of two affidavits submitted in opposition to
Bank One's motion for summary judgment. Apparently, two affidavits by Francee Jolley exist, a
longer version and a shorter version. The longer version contains two paragraphs that do not
appear in the shorter version. Appellant has checked the record and has learned that the shorter
version was the one that was submitted to the trial court. Accordingly, appellant respectfully
requests that this Court disregard the citation to the longer version in its Brief at page 10, and
substitute in its stead the language of paragraph five of the shorter version, which reads:
On Tuesday May 30, 1995, the day after the holiday, Mr. Herwit's account
did not have sufficient funds to cover the check and the check was returned
to Bank One on that day. To my knowledge, check #2526 has never been
paid by First Security Bank.
This language is substantially similar to the language cited in the longer version of the affidavit, and
therefore should not cause appellee any prejudice.l For the Court's convenience, appellant has
attached the longer version of Francee Jolley's affidavit as Addendum 1. The shorter version is
also attached as Addendum 2.

^ a n k One itself admits that this material does not prejudice its position, stating: "[e]ven if
this material appeared in the affidavit of Francee Jolley it would be irrelevant." Appellee's Brief at
23.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BANK ONE, UTAH, National
Association, fka VALLEY BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, National
Association,
Case No. 950714-CA
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Priority No. 15
vs.
PAULHERWIT,
Defendant and Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PAULHERWIT

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellee's Brief is littered with numerous asides and gross misstatements that attempt to
obfuscate the central issues on appeal. This Court should not be sidetracked by any of appellee's
superfluous arguments. The merits of this case cry out to be heard, and this Court should properly
focus its attention upon them.
Appellee's assertion that Herwit's appeal is not based upon the record is groundless. This
appeal is based squarely on the record and does not purport to raise any new issues that were not
presented before the trial court.
This Court should reverse the circuit court's entry of summary judgment because Bank
One has failed to demonstrate the nonexistence of any genuine issues of material fact. Genuine
2

issues of material fact remain unresolved with respect to Bank One's claim as a holder in due
course. These issues include (1) whether Bank One was on notice of any infirmities in appellant's
check when deposited, and (2) whether Bank One acted in good faith in handling the check. Since
these issues remain unresolved, the trial court's decision to allow Bank One to enforce appellant's
check cannot be affirmed on this ground. Nor can the decision be affirmed on the ground that
Bank One was a mere holder of the instrument. As a mere holder of the check, Bank One is
subject to the same defenses that appellant has asserted against Aristocrat, the immediate transferor
of the instrument. Appellant has asserted several valid defenses against Aristocrat. These defenses
apply equally as well to Bank One. Appellant is entitled to have these defenses resolved at trial.
Consequently, this Court should reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case for
trial.

ARGUMENT
I.

BANK ONE'S REBUTTAL TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT
OF FACTS IS SUPERFLUOUS AND INTENDED TO OBFUSCATE
THE MERITS OF THIS APPEAL

In its appellee brief, Bank One argues that appellant's Statement of Facts is not supported
by the record. Appellee's Brief at 4. Appellee's assertions are groundless and obviously represent
an attempt by appellee to obscure the merits of this appeal. Contrary to appellee's assertions,
appellant's Statement of Facts is amply supported by the record, which can only be described as
scanty at best. The following is submitted in an effort to answer "Appellee's Rebuttal To
Appellant's Statement of Facts:"
1. On or about May 19, 1995, Herwit drew check number 2526 on
his account at First Security Bank for $9000. (Complaint, % 5; Answer, f 1).
3

The check was made payable to Aristocrat Travel and Cruises ("Aristocrat")
and was meant to purchase ownership in the company. (Complaint, f 6;
Answer, % 1; Affidavit of Paul Herwit, f 2). Herwit instructed Aristocrat to
hold on to the check until Herwit had enough funds in his account to cover it.
(Answer, f 4; Affidavit of Paul Herwit, % 3). Aristocrat was fully advised
that the check would not clear until the closing on Herwit's condominium
occurred. (Answer, f 4; Affidavit of Paul Herwit, K 3). However, on May
25, 1995, an Aristocrat employee presented the check to Bank One for
payment. (Complaint, f 7; Answer, ^ 4; Affidavit of Paul Herwit, f 4).
2. Upon deposit of the check, Bank One credited Aristocrat's
account for $9000, but did not allow Aristocrat to immediately withdraw
funds in the amount of the check. (Complaint, ^ 8; Answer, % 3; Affidavit of
Paul Herwit, ^[ 4; Affidavit of Deanne Freeman, ff 5-6). Bank One then
sent the check along to First Security Bank ("First Security") for collection.
(Complaint, ^ 14; Answer K 3; Affidavit of Deanne Freeman, f^[ 4-6). On
May 30,1995, without awaiting word from First Security as to whether
Herwit's check had cleared, Bank One allowed Aristocrat to make a
withdrawal in the amount of the check. (Answer, ^flf 4-5; Affidavit of
Francee Jolley, Tffl 3-5; Affidavit of Paul Herwit, ^ 5-7). That very same
day, First Security refused to accept Herwit's check and refused to remit
payment thereon. (Complaint, % 15; Answer, ^ 3). First Security stamped
the instrument "RTM" (refer to maker) and returned it due to insufficient
funds. (Complaint, ^ 15; Answer, ^| 3).
3. Rather than immediately debiting $9000 from Aristocrat's
account, Bank One continued to credit the account in the amount of Herwit's
check. (Affidavit of Paul Herwit, ff 5-7). Over the next two months, the
branch manager at Bank One telephoned Capital Assets to inquire into
whether there had been a closing yet on Herwit's condo. (Answer, 1fl[ 4-5;
Affidavit of Paul Herwit, ff 5-6). During this same time, the branch
manager also phoned Herwit to ask about the closing. Herwit informed him
that there had not yet been a closing and that he had no idea whether one
would ever take place. (Answer, 1fl| 4-5; Herwit Affidavit, Iffl 5-6).
4. Aristocrat subsequently became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy.
As a result, Bank One proceeded to enforce its claim to payment on the
$9000 check against Herwit. (Complaint of Bank One). On August 23,
1995, Bank One filed a motion for summary judgment with the circuit court.
(Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment). In support of its motion,
Bank One contended that it was a holder in due course. Bank One also
argued that if it was not a holder in due course, it was at least a holder of the
check and was thus entitled to enforce it against Herwit. (Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Bank One's Motion for Summary
4

Judgment, pp. 8-10). Bank One's motion was opposed by two affidavits.
(Affidavit of Paul Herwit; Affidavit of Francee Jolley). On September 28,
1995, the circuit court issued an order granting Bank One's motion for
summary judgment. (Order of September 28, 1995). Herwit appeals from
this order.
To be sure, appellant inadvertantly failed to cite to the record in compiling its initial
Statement of Facts. This was an error in procedure, not in substance. This Court should not hold
any minor deficiencies in that section against the appellant. Further, in order that the merits of this
case might be heard, appellant has graciously afforded appellee with additional time within which
to submit its brief. Appellee has apparently used this extra time to quibble over issues that tend
only to obfuscate and raise a smokescreen of trivial procedural inadequacies. Appellee could have
better used this time to insure that its own brief was submitted in perfect order. It did not. As a
result, Appellee's Brief is littered with numerous deficiencies and gross misstatements, which
overlap into substantive claims, to wit:
1. Appellee's Brief contains a section entitled "Determinative Rules and Statutes," which
cites to three rules of practice that are obviously not determinative of any of the issues on appeal
See Appellee Brief at 2-3. Notably absent are any citations to the Utah Uniform Commercial
Code, which provisions are actually dispositive.
2. The first six pages of Appellee's Brief are printed on only one side of the paper. The
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure mandate printing on both sides. See Utah R. App. P. 27(b)
("Briefs shall be printed on both sides of the page ... .").
3. Appellee's Brief does not have a separate section reciting the applicable standard of
review as required by Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Utah R. App. P. 24; see
also Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1991) (noting purpose of standard of review
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requirement and stating that it should not be ignored by the parties). The only standard of review
that can be gleaned from Appellee's Brief is that of "correctness." See Appellee's Brief at 1-2.
That standard is hopelessly misleading and provides the Court with little guidance in resolving the
issues in this appeal. The proper standard that this Court should apply was recited in Appellant's
Brief at page 2. This standard can be summarized as follows: when reviewing an appeal from a
summary judgment, this Court will inquire whether there is any genuine issue as to any material
fact, and if there is not, whether the moving party (appellee) is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law. This Court will liberally construe the evidence in favor of the party (appellant) who
opposed the motion for summary judgment Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233, 235
(Utah 1993); English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah
1989).
4. Appellee's section entitled "Statement of the Issues Presented on Appeal" is unduly
argumentative. See Appellee's Brief at 1-2. Appellee's first issue is particularly inappropriate, and
also grossly misleading. Contrary to appellee's assertions, appellant's trial counsel submitted two
affidavits in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment. Although appellant has
subsequently obtained new counsel, Appellant's Brief is predicated solely upon the record before
the trial court and does not purport to raise any new issues for the first time on appeal. See infra
Argument II.
5. Appellee contends that Appellant's Brief refers to normal commercial banking practices
that do not appear in the record. See Appellee Brief at 6, f 7. These references are supported by
the following case citations and do not have to be made part of the record: Seinfeld v. Commercial
Bank & Trust Co., 405 So.2d 1039, 1042 (Fla.App.3 Dist 1981) ("[Wjhile we might agree that,
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standing alone, neither its indulgence of a chronically overdrawn depositor, nor its failure to
observe the normal commercial practices of waiting for the checks to clear and determining
the balance in Seinfeld's account before paying on them might not have been sufficient evidence
of bad faith, the coexistence of all these factors raises at least a reasonable inference that the bank
acted as precipitously and 'foolishly' as it did in order to attempt to shift to Seinfeld its own
probable loss from Wolfson's machinations ...") (citations omitted) (emphasis added); National
Savings & Trust Co. v. Park Corp.. 722 F.2d 1303, 1304 (6th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 466 U.S.
989 (1984) ("Neither employee followed the bank's standard procedure and check DATs
account to ensure that it held sufficient funds to cover the check.") (emphasis added).
6. In footnote 6 at page 26 in Appellee's Brief, Appellee argues that page 14 of
Appellant's Brief cites to language from an old edition of the Utah Code. This allegation is simply
untrue. APPELLANT'S BRIEF AT PAGE 14 CITES FIRST TO WHITE & SUMMERS AND
THEN TO THE MOST RECENT EDITION OF THE UTAH CODE, THE 1995 SUPPLEMENT. That appellee's allegations are unfounded is further evidenced by the fact that
Appellant's citation to § 70A-3-305 in its "Determinative Provisions" section matches exactly the
citation that appears in footnote 6 of Appellee's Brief, except that APPELLEE MISQUOTES the
last word of subsection (c)(1) as "transaction" rather than as "instrument." Compare Appellant's
Brief at 4 with Appellee's Brief at 26 n.6.
Appellee's Brief is thus filled with numerous asides and gross misstatements that attempt to
mask the central issues in this case. Appellee's obfuscatory tactics are of no assistance to the
Court in resolving any of the legitimate issues presented on appeal. Appellant therefore urges this
Court to look beyond appellee's extraneous blustering and concentrate instead on the merits of this
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case. See State v. Cook. 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986) (stating that inappropriate language of any
kind does not assist courts in resolving main issues on appeal and has no place in an appellate
brief).

H.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF IS BASED SQUARELY ON THE RECORD
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND DOES NOT PURPORT TO
RAISE ANY NEW ISSUES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL

Appellee consistently argues in its Brief that appellant has attempted to raise new
arguments for the first time on appeal that were not raised before the trial court. Appellee's
assertions are disingenuous. Contrary to appellee's claims, Herwit's appeal is based squarely on
the record that appeared before the trial court.
Appellee seems to be of the view that because appellant's trial counsel chose to oppose
Bank One's motion for summary judgment with two affidavits and no accompanying
memorandum, appellant is somehow now precluded from bringing an appeal based upon those
affidavits. For example, appellee at page 12 of its brief argues: "Herwit failed to raise defenses by
subsequent motion and failed to submit a memorandum containing any legal argument to the court
in opposition to the underlying Motion for Summary Judgment. As a result, Herwit has failed to
preserve any issue for appeal." In support of this position, appellee cites to a litany of cases that
stand for nothing more than the simple proposition that appellate courts will not consider issues
raised for the first time on appeal. Not a single case that appellee cites holds that a party is
precluded from opposing a motion for summary judgment with a bare affidavit. Moreover, none
of the cases hold that a party who has opposed a motion for summary judgment with an affidavit is
thereafter precluded from appealing the court's decision.
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Utah case law expressly provides that when a party files a motion for summary judgment
supported by an affidavit, the opposing party must respond with a counter affidavit. See D & L
Supply v, Saurini. 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989). Appellant has responded to Bank One's motion for
summary judgment with two affidavits. This appeal is based squarely upon those affidavits, and
does not purport to raise any new issues for the first time on appeal. Appellee's claim that "[h]ad
Herwit, [sic] articulated his arguments before the trial court..., Bank One would have had an
opportunity to respond thereto" is simply untenable. See Appellee Brief at 13. Appellee did have
an opportunity to respond to appellant's arguments, and used that opportunity to submit a Reply
Memorandum of September 14, 1995. Appellee's assertions thus lack merit, and this Court
should properly disregard them.

IE

GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST PRECLUDING
BANK ONE'S EFFORTS TO ENFORCE HERWIT'S CHECK AS
A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE

Point III of Appellee's Brief, which analyzes Bank One's status as a holder in due course,
completely ignores appellant's arguments. In this section, appellee lists one fact after another that
appellee contends is "undisputed." This is obviously an overstatement. Appellant directly disputes
several facts that undercut Bank One's status as a holder in due course ("HDC"). First, appellant
disputes the fact that Bank One took appellant's $9000 check without notice of any infirmities in
the instrument. Second, appellant disputes the fact that Bank One's actions satisfy the test of
"good faith." These facts are essential to the overriding issue of Bank One's status as an HDC.
Under the applicable standard of review, appellant is entitled to have these facts construed in the
light most favorable to his position. When this is done, the trial court's entry of summary

9

judgment in favor of Bank One cannot be affirmed on this ground.
At page 21 of its Brief, Bank One argues that appellant has not asserted facts disputing
Bank One's claim of lack of notice when it took appellant's check on May 26, 1995. Appellee
argues: "Herwit's affidavits do not allege such a fact. Herwit appears to argue that Bank One is
imputed with the knowledge of its depositor, or immediate prior transfer.... That entities
knowledge cannot be imputed to Bank One." Appellee's Brief at 21.
Appellee's assertions are disingenuous. From the beginning, appellant has asserted facts
alleging that Bank One was on notice that appellant's check would not clear when deposited. For
example, appellant's Answer states: "Aristocrat and [Bank One] were fully advised that the check
would not clear." Answer, f 4 (attached hereto as Addendum 1). The Answer further provides:
"In answering paragraph 12, denies that the check was cashed and affirmatively states that
plaintiff was fully advised by both Aristocrat and defendant that the check would not clear."
Answer, f 5 (emphasis added). Moreover, appellant's affidavit states: "From the date plaintiff
[Bank One] received defendant's check to the present, plaintiff knew that the check would not
clear defendant's bank." Affidavit of Paul Herwit, f 6 (emphasis added). Herwit's affidavit
goes on to state: "The check has never been honored and plaintiff was given notice many times by
defendant that the check would not be honored and plaintiff also had notice from defendant's
bank that the check would not be honored." Id. at f 7.
These facts clearly place Bank One on notice of a defect in Herwit's check. As stated
previously, appellant is entitled to have these facts construed in the light most favorable to his
position. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 233, 235; English, 774 P.2d at 1155. That being the case, Bank
One has not established a crucial element of HDC status: notice. Therefore, Bank One is not
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entitled to enforce the instrument on that ground.
There is a further reason why Bank One does not properly qualify as an HDC. This is
because in taking the instrument, Bank One failed to act in "good faith." Appellee correctly notes
in its brief that the proper definition of that term under the Utah Code is "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-103 (Supp. 1995).2 However, a
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Bank One's actions in handling Herwit's check
satisfy this standard. It is not enough to merely allege that Bank One's actions meet the test of
good faith. As the party seeking the status of an HDC, Bank One has the affirmative duty of
conclusively demonstrating that its actions meet this standard.3 This is a question properly

2

Appellant's Brief at page 11 mistakenly included the definition of "good faith" as that term
is defined in Section 3-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code without providing the corresponding
definition of that term under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. The first full paragraph on
page 11 of Appellant's Brief should have read:
Good faith is defined in § 70A-3-103 of the Utah Code. Section
70A-3-103 provides: "'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned.'" This definition is derived from the Uniform
Commercial Code, which defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." UCC § 3103. Comment 4 to section 3-103 of the UCC provides clarification. It
states, "[although fair dealing is a broad term that must be defined in
context, it is clear that it is concerned with the fairness of conduct rather than
the care with which an act is performed." UCC § 3-103 cmt. 4.
Appellant's Brief at page 3 should also be modified such that the definition of good faith
provided under the Utah Code appears rather than the definition under the UCC.
3

It should be noted that Herwit is not, as appellee argues at page 17 of its brief, defining
good faith as an "objective test." The Seinfeld case, which Herwit cites in his brief at pages 12
and 16, makes perfectly clear that this is a subjective test. The Seinfeld court stated: "[T]he issue
of both 'good faith' and lack of notice are based upon the bank's subjective knowledge and state
of mind ..." 405 So.2d at 1041 (citations omitted). The court added: "It is true that the Florida
version of the holder in due course provision of the U.C.C. does seem to protect the objectively
stupid so long as he is subjectively pure of heart. But playing dumb is not the same as being
11

determined by the trier of fact See, e.g.. Community Bank v. Ell. 564 P.2d 685, 691 (Or. 1977)
(en banc) ("The trial court did not err in refusing to withdraw the issue of Community's good faith
from the jury's consideration.... The question is generally one for the jury unless only one
inference from the jury is possible."); Northside Bank of Tampa v. Investors Acceptance Corp..
278 F.Supp. 191, 192 (W.D. Penn. 1968) ("[T]he elements constituting a holder in due course are
questions of fact for the triers of fact to determine."). No findings of fact have been made in this
case. If any doubt exists as to whether an entity qualifies as a holder in due course, such doubt
must be resolved against the entry of summary judgment. Northside Bank. 278 F.Supp. at 19293; DuPont v. County Nat'l Bank. 369 So.2d 443, 443 (Fla.App. 3 Dist 1979). Labeling Bank
One as a holder in due course would at this point be premature. Consequently, this Court should
reverse the circuit court's decision and remand the case for trial.

IV. BANK ONE'S STATUS AS A MERE "HOLDER" OF HERWIT'S
CHECK IS SUBJECT TO DEFENSES THAT NEED TO BE
RESOLVED AT TRIAL
If Bank One fails to qualify as a holder in due course, its status as a mere holder of
Herwit's check is subject to a number of defenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-305, -306
(Supp. 1995). These defenses include violation of delivery for a special purpose, breach of an oral
agreement to hold on to the check, and failure of consideration. See Appellant's Brief at 13-15.
The appropriate resolution of these defenses is at trial. Accordingly, the trial court's entry of
summary judgment appears to have been improvidently granted.

dumb. A mere protestation of one's own innocence is not enough to conclusively establish that
this is really true when the trier of fact could find from the admitted circumstances that something
more than simplemindedness lay behind the conduct in question." Id. at 1042.
12

Bank One argues in its Brief at page 27 that none of these defenses are available to Herwit
because they are affirmative defenses that should have been raised by way of answer. Bank One
contends: "Herwit has raised no affirmative defenses by way of answer. The defenses on which
Herwit relies in this appeal are affirmative defenses which were waived due to Herwit's failure to
properly raise them below." Appellee's Brief at 27.
Again, Bank One's assertions are disingenuous. Herwit's answer to Bank One's complaint
lists two affirmative defenses. The first affirmative defense provides that Bank One failed to join
an indispensable party, i.e., Aristocrat. See Answer, p. 1 (attached hereto as Addendum 3).
Aristocrat is the entity responsible for presenting Herwit's check to Bank One. Herwit's answer
makes patently clear that he has several defenses available against Aristocrat. These defenses are
also properly applicable to Bank One as well. White & Summers § 14-6 at 52 (Supp. 1993).
Because these defenses need to be resolved at trial, this Court should reverse the circuit court's
entry of summary judgment and remand the case for trial.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, appellant respectfully asks this Court to reverse the decision of
the circuit court granting Bank One's motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is
inappropriate in this case because appellee has not conclusively demonstrated its status as a holder
in due course. At this point, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the crucial elements of
notice and good faith. Any doubts as to whether these elements are met must be resolved in favor
of appellant. Accordingly, the trial court's decision cannot be affirmed upon this ground. Further,
Bank One's claim to enforce appellant's check as a mere holder of the instrument is subject to a

13

number of defenses that need to be resolved at trial. This Court should therefore reverse the
circuit court's decision and remand the case for trial.
DATED this 15th day of March, 1996.
Respectfully submitted,

Trrant W. P. Morrison, Attorney for Appellant
Paul Herwit
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

This is to certify that I mailed, first class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing brief to:
Arnold Richer
MarkE. Medcalf
Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellee Bank One
311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on the 15th day of March, 1996.

Grant W. P. Morrison, Attorney for
Appellant Paul Herwit
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Attachments

H. Delbert Welker (3418)
3540 South 4000 West, #430
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: 963-0555
Attorneys for Defendant
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
BANK ONE, UTAH, National

Association, fka VALLEY BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, National

Association,

;

Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:
:

PAUL HERWIT,
Defendant.

:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF FRANCEE JOLLEY
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 950009179
Judge: Hutchings

FRANCEE JOLLEY, having been duly sworn, hereby deposes
and states the following:
1.

The affiant is the Operations Manager of the Park

City, branch of First Security Bank.
2.

The affiant has personal knowledge of the following

events.
3. On May 26, 1995, Friday afternoon, Memorial Day Weekend, the Park City, branch of First Security Bank received a check
on the account of Paul Herwit, #252 6 in the amount of $9,000.00.
4. Mr. Herwit's account did not have sufficient funds to
cover the check.
5.

On Tuesday May 30, 1995, the day after the holiday,

Mr. Herwit's account did not have sufficient funds to cover the
check and the check was returned to Bank One on that day.

6.

I never had a conversation with anyone stating that

First Security would honor the foregoing check. In fact, the check
was not honored nor has it ever been honored.
7. As operations manager, I would be aware as to whether
anyone in our office would have either honored the check or stated
to any party that the check was honored.

I have discussed the

matter with the Branch Manager. It is against bank policy to honor
a check received the way Mr. Herwit's was received.

Neither the

branch manager nor me ever honored the foregoing check nor did we
state to anyone that the check would be honored.

In fact, the

check was dishonored on May 30, 1995 and returned that day to Bank
One.
Dated this

day of

, 1995.

FRANCEE JOLLEY
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this
, 1995.

day of

Notary Public
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Affidavit of Francee Jolley to Arnold Richer, Esq. RICHER, SWAN &
OVERHOLT, 311 South State Street, #280, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on this
day of
, 1995.

H. Delbert Welker (3418)
3540 South 4000 West, #430
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: 963-0555
Attorneys for Defendant
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
BANK ONE, UTAH, National
Association, fka VALLEY BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, National

Association,

:
:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF FRANCEE JOLLEY
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

:

Civil No. 950009179

:

Judge: Hutchings

Plaintiff,
vs.
PAUL HERWIT,
Defendant.

FRANCEE JOLLEY, having been duly sworn, hereby deposes
and states the following:
1.

The affiant is the Operations Manager of the Park

City, branch of First Security Bank.
2.

The affiant has personal knowledge of the following

events.
3. On May 26, 1995, Friday afternoon, Memorial Day Weekend, the Park City, branch of First Security Bank received a check
on the account of Paul Herwit, #2526 in the amount of $9,000.00.
4. Mr. Herwit's account did not have sufficient funds to
cover the check.
5.

On Tuesday May 30, 1995, the day after the holiday,

Mr. Herwit's account did not have sufficient funds to cover the
check and the check was returned to Bank One on that day.

To my

knowledge, check #252 6 has never been paid by First Security Bank.
Dated this

day of

, 1995.

FRANCEE JOLLEY
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this
, 1995.

day of

Notary Public
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Affidavit of Francee Jolley to Arnold Richer, Esq. RICHER, SWAN &
OVERHOLT, 311 South State Street, #280, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on this
day of
, 1995.

H. Delbert Welker (3418)
3540 South 4000 West, #430
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: 963-0555
Attorneys for Defendant
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
BANK ONE, UTAH, National
Association, fka VALLEY BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, National
Association,

:

ANSWER

:

Civil No. 950009179

Plaintiff,
vs.
PAUL HERWIT,
Defendant.

Judge: Hutchings

Defendant, by and through his counsel, responds to
plaintiff's complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
The Complaint fails to join an indispensable party.
SECOND DEFENSE
Defendant answers plaintiff's complaint as follows:
1. Admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 2,
3, 5 and 6.
2. Denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 9, 11,
13, 16 and 17.
3.

Denies

for

lack

of

knowledge

the

allegations

contained in paragraphs 8, 10, 12, 14 and 15.
4.

In answering paragraph 7, admits that the check was

presented to the bank but defendant did not authorize any employee
of Aristocrat to present the check for payment.

Aristocrat and

defendant were fully advised that the check would not clear.
Defendant denies all other allegations contained therein.
5.

In answering paragraph 12, denies that the check was

cashed and affirmatively states that plaintiff was fully advised by
both Aristocrat and defendant that the check would not clear.
Dated thi S/ ^/ day of

faZte*^

jp),/Jf

, 1995.

//^

H. Delbert Welker
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Answer to Arnold Richer, Esq. RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, 311 South
State^treet,/#280, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this /£ day of
, 1995.

^O I/M£

